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Abstract
Attempts to revisit Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ (OtA) paradigm present serious ethical challenges. In recent years
new paradigms have been developed to circumvent these challenges but none involve using Milgram’s own procedures
and asking naı¨ve participants to deliver the maximum level of shock. This was achieved in the present research by using
Immersive Digital Realism (IDR) to revisit the OtA paradigm. IDR is a dramatic method that involves a director collaborating
with professional actors to develop characters, the strategic withholding of contextual information, and immersion in a real-
world environment. 14 actors took part in an IDR study in which they were assigned to conditions that restaged Milgrams’s
New Baseline (‘Coronary’) condition and four other variants. Post-experimental interviews also assessed participants’
identification with Experimenter and Learner. Participants’ behaviour closely resembled that observed in Milgram’s original
research. In particular, this was evidenced by (a) all being willing to administer shocks greater than 150 volts, (b) near-
universal refusal to continue after being told by the Experimenter that ‘‘you have no other choice, you must continue’’
(Milgram’s fourth prod and the one most resembling an order), and (c) a strong correlation between the maximum level of
shock that participants administered and the mean maximum shock delivered in the corresponding variant in Milgram’s
own research. Consistent with an engaged follower account, relative identification with the Experimenter (vs. the Learner)
was also a good predictor of the maximum shock that participants administered.
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Introduction
I liked my psychotherapist, Dr Baum, but I had to argue with
what she was trying to achieve. She wanted to cleanse the guilt I
carried around with me, which would give me a start on dealing
with the depression, and remove some of the inner conflict that
was causing the anxiety. The quickest way out was to get me to
deny responsibility.
People do terrible things during war. I was acting under orders.
Had I heard of the Milgram experiment? Yes, I told her I had.
(This surprised her.) This was the experiment where normal
people were ordered to deliver shocks to someone behind a
curtain. The shocks were not real and the screams were those of an
actor, but the subject didn’t know that. Nevertheless, they
continued to follow orders. ‘‘People go into a state of agency
and act not on their own volition,’’ she explained to me. She made
it sound like they didn’t have a choice, and I knew that was wrong.
Tony Lagouranis [1].
Stanley Milgram’s studies of ‘Obedience to Authority’ (OtA) can
lay some claim to being the best known in the whole of psychology
[2,3,4,5]. In these, members of the New Haven community
(mainly men) volunteered to participate in a study ostensibly
designed to investigate the effects of punishment on learning.
When they turned up at the lab, they found themselves cast in the
role of a ‘Teacher’ and with the job of administering electric
shocks to another man (the ‘Learner’) whenever he made an error
on a word recognition task. The shocks were administered
progressively via a machine on which 30 switches signified
escalating levels of shock – starting at 15 volts (designated ‘SLIGHT
SHOCK’) but rising to 450 volts (ominously designated ‘XXX’).
In fact the machine did not deliver shocks and the Learner was
a confederate, but the Teachers did not know this. The true
purpose of the research was also not to study memory, but to see
how far participants would go in following the Experimenter’s
instructions. Most critically, would they be willing to administer a
potentially lethal shock to an innocent man when instructed to do
so by a figure of authority?
When Milgram asked ordinary people what they thought they
would do, most believed that they would go no further than
135 volts. None believed that they would go above 300 volts, let
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alone all the way to the 450-volt maximum. When he asked
psychiatrists what they thought ordinary people would do, they
predicted that only a pathological fringe constituting some 5% of
the population would go beyond 300 volts, and that only just over
0.1% would go to the maximum [6]. Yet when Milgram ran what
he originally termed the ‘‘Coronary condition’’, 26 out of 40
ordinary Americans (65%) went up to 450 volts. In this condition
(which later became known as the ‘‘New Baseline’’ [7,8]) the
Learner reacts to the ‘shocks’ with a series of scripted exclamations
and protestations, including, at 150 volts, ‘‘Ugh!!! Experimenter!
That’s all. Get me out of here, please. My heart’s starting to bother
me. I refuse to go on. Let me out.’’, and at the 330-volt point he
screamed ‘‘Let me out of here… My heart’s bothering me. Let me
out, I tell you. (Hysterically.) Let me out of here.’’ [6,9].
The fame of Milgram’s studies derives largely from the sheer
power and unexpectedness of these results. Unlike most psycho-
logical experimentation, in which laboratory phenomena are far
more pallid than their real-world counterparts, Milgram seemed to
have reproduced in his studies the very types of horrific conduct
that had scarred the history of his times. The parallel with the Nazi
holocaust seemed direct and compelling. What is more, the impact
of Milgram’s work was greatly enhanced by his work as a film-
maker and the documentary Obedience was critical in bringing his
findings before a wider public [10].
But besides the phenomena themselves, there are two other
things for which the OtA experiments are remembered and which
reverberate still. The first is conceptual and has to do with a shift
from dispositionalism to situationism in the explanation of human
behaviour. This relates to Milgram’s conclusion that ‘‘it is not so
much the kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in which
he finds himself that determines how he will act’’ [2] (p. 101) and
that ‘‘the ordinary person who shocked the person did so out of a
sense of obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject – and
not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies’’ [6] (pp. 23–24).
More formally, these observations became the basis for Milgram’s
agentic state theory which argued that participants were so focussed
on the authority, and so bound up with the task of carrying out
instructions to the best of their ability, that they lost sight of the
consequences of their actions and of their moral implications. In
the simpler terms used by the New York Times when announcing
Milgram’s findings to the world, this means that people cannot
help but ‘‘blindly obey orders’’ [11]. In coming to this conclusion,
Milgram also acknowledged a debt to Hannah Arendt’s concept of
the ‘banality of evil’ derived from her observations at the trial of
the Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann [6,12].
The second reason why the OtA studies are remembered is for
the ethical controversy they generated. This controversy began
almost immediately after the publication of Milgram’s first paper
when Diana Baumrind wrote an article for American Psychologist
in which she noted the extreme tension experienced by Milgram’s
participants and decried ‘‘the kind of indignities to which [his]
subjects were exposed’’ [13] (p. 423). She concluded: ‘‘I would not
like to see experiments such as Milgram’s proceed unless the
subjects were fully informed of the dangers of serious aftereffects
and his correctives were clearly shown to be effective in restoring
their state of well being’’ [13] (p. 423). In his defence, Milgram
invoked post-experimental survey data and psychiatrists’ reports to
demonstrate that most participants were glad to have participated
and that none had been harmed [14].
Elsewhere we have argued that both Baumrind and Milgram
miss a key point here. For even though Milgram managed to
reconcile his participants to what they had done, it is apparent that
he only achieved this by convincing them that it was acceptable to
cause suffering in the name of scientific progress [15]. Neverthe-
less, however one argues the case, ethical concerns render it
impossible to replicate Milgram’s study in today’s world. And this
creates a dilemma. For if one wants to question the conceptual
account used by Milgram to explain his findings, one is prevented
from doing so by the impossibility of using his paradigm to
examine exactly what factors do (or do not) produce obedience.
In a sense, then, the two things for which Milgram is
remembered have become mutually sustaining in so far as the
ethical controversy has made the theory more resilient. Indeed,
this is a key reason why notions of the banality of evil and of the
inherent blindness of obedience continue to dominate contempo-
rary teaching and scholarship as well as popular thinking around
these issues [16,17]. There are, however growing reasons to think
that these ideas are inadequate and hence for wanting to find a
way to challenge their empirical basis.
Questioning the Banality of Evil and the Blindness
of Obedience
As we have already intimated, one of the reasons for Milgram’s
impact has to do with the resonance between his studies and real-
world phenomena – notably the Holocaust. Here Arendt’s
portrayal of Adolf Eichmann as an ordinary bureaucrat, so
focussed on making the trains run on time that he forgot he was
transporting millions to their death, seemed to put the stamp of
historical authenticity on Milgram’s analysis. Yet a range of recent
studies of perpetrators in general, of Nazi functionaries, and of
Eichmann himself have questioned just how banal and unaware
these people were [18,19,20,21]. Contrary to the suggestion that
they were merely puppets of those in authority, it seems that they
knew exactly what they were doing, that they believed in what they
were doing, and that they showed considerable creativity in
pursuing and exterminating their victims. In short, they were
committed and creative disciples of a collective cause [22]. As the
prosecutor, Gideon Hausner noted, this meant that Eichmann had
‘‘not only fulfilled orders in rounding up Jews for deportation to
extermination camps, but had gone about his work with
extraordinary zeal and initiative’’ [23].
But while evidence from history might begin to cast doubt on
the agentic state account, perhaps the most compelling case
against this model comes from close scrutiny of Milgram’s own
findings. Three issues, in particular, are relevant here.
First, when one looks at the full range of experimental variants
that Milgram conducted (as opposed to focusing only on the New
Baseline condition), it is apparent that ‘obedience’ varied from 0%
to 100%. What is more, this variation in obedience cannot be
explained through variations in the extent to which they
encouraged participants to cede responsibility to the Experimenter
[24]. More generally, then, the agentic state model fails to engage
with the fact that these are studies of disobedience as well as
obedience.
Second, there is a range of evidence that points to the fact that
participants pay heed to the Learner as well as the Experimenter.
In particular, Packer [25] has shown that the points at which
participants are most likely to break off from the study are those
where the Learner utters his most vehement protests (notably the
150-volt mark). As Nick Haslam and colleagues conclude, these
and similar findings imply that any model, such as the agentic state
account, which ‘‘sees the study exclusively through the lens of the
Experimenter’s influence on the Teacher … must be incomplete’’
[26] (p. 9). Teachers attend to both the Learner and the
Experimenter, and the key question becomes when and why they
attend to one voice (the Experimenter urging ‘continue’) rather
than the other (the Learner pleading ‘stop’).
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Third, an analysis of the verbal interactions between the
Experimenter and the Learner gives valuable insights into what
succeeded, and what failed, in securing obedience. In particular, it
is instructive to see what happened when the Experimenter used a
series of four pre-defined ‘prods’ to urge the Teacher to continue if
he proved reluctance to proceed. The first of these was a simple
‘‘please continue’’, the second ‘‘the experiment requires that you
continue’’, the third ‘‘it is absolutely essential that you continue’’
and the fourth ‘‘you have no other choice, you must continue’’. As
we and others have noted, of these, only the last is a clear order,
the others being a combination of requests and justifications
[27,28]. And yet, on nearly every occasion that the fourth prod
was used, participants responded by refusing to continue. This can
be seen in the following examples [29]:
E: You have no other choice, Teacher, you must continue.
T: Yes I do have a choice. I’m not going to go ahead with it.
E: Then we’ll have to discontinue the experiment then.
T: I’m sorry.
[refuses to continue]
E: You have no other choice, you must go on.
T: Yes I have a choice.
E: That is, if you don’t continue we’ll have to discontinue the
experiment.
T: Just cut it out, after all, he knows what he can stand. That’s my
opinion and that’s where I’m going to stand on it.
[refuses to continue]
A similar pattern of responses to prods emerged from a more
recent replication of Milgram’s studies by Burger [27,30] in which
ethical problems were side-stepped by only requiring participants
to administer shocks of up to 150 volts. Here, every time the fourth
prod was used, participants refused to continue. There is, however,
an important confound with order here, as it might be the case
that, having already refused three prods, participants were
disinclined to respond positively to a fourth (whatever its content).
However, in a study where the four different prods were
manipulated between participants (so that different participants
received different prods in separate conditions), the order-like
fourth prod clearly proved least effective [15]. Whatever else they
show, Milgram’s studies thus provide little evidence of people
blindly obeying orders [31].
In order to explain these findings, Haslam and Reicher argue
that orders fail to secure compliance because they disrupt the
inclusive relationship between the Experimenter and the Teacher.
When the Experimenter issues a request or a justification, it
suggests that he and the Teacher are involved together as partners
in a common enterprise. An order, by contrast, sets the
Experimenter apart from and against the participant. This analysis
also accords with other evidence that these researchers have drawn
upon in developing an ‘engaged followership’ model of obedience
[15,31,32,33].
According to this model, whether the Teacher attends to the
voice of the Experimenter or the Learner – and hence whether he
shows obedience or disobedience – hinges upon his identification
with both parties. More specifically, do participants identify with
the science of the study, and with the Experimenter as a
representative of that science (in which case they obey), or do
they identify with the Learner as a fellow member of the general
community (in which case they disobey)? As an initial test of the
model, contemporary observers were provided with Milgram’s
own descriptions of his experimental variants and asked to
estimate the extent to which the features of each would lead
them to identify with the Experimenter and the Learner [33]. As
predicted, there was a strong positive correlation between
estimated identification with the Experimenter (iE) and the level
of obedience observed in a particular variant, as well as a strong
negative correlation between identification with the Learner (iL)
and obedience, and a strong positive correlation between relative
identification (iE – iL) and obedience.
Although these various findings are consistent with the engaged
follower model, they are of course highly constrained by the fact of
being rooted in post-hoc estimates and retrospective reinterpreta-
tions of archival data. In particular, we are not able to examine
directly the role of constructs like identification because Milgram
did not measure them. More definitive support for the model – or
indeed for any alternative to the agentic state approach – depends
on being able to design new studies and collect new data. But here
we come back to our core dilemma in which the conceptual need
for new understanding is constrained by the empirical (because
unethical) impossibility of revisiting the classic obedience studies.
Unless we are able to solve this dilemma – to devise studies of
obedience that are controlled, impactful and ethical – our
theoretical understanding of a core social phenomenon will
remain rooted in the past [16].
Overcoming Ethical Barriers to Progress and
Exploring Disobedience
We have already pointed to some of the ways in which
researchers have sought to overcome the ethical limits to
obedience research. In addition to mining the archives, one
approach has been to replicate the basic paradigm but to stop
before the point that people are asked to inflict apparently lethal
shocks and hence both limiting stress in the study and potential
harm after the study [27,30]. A different approach has been to
produce a structural analogue of the Milgram paradigm in which
participants are asked to inflict (apparent) harm on a target in an
escalating series of steps. However, to deal with the ethical
concerns, the harm is never as great as in the original. Besides the
example provided above, which involves attributing negative
attributes to groups [28], others have asked participants to give
destructive feedback to job applicants [34], to feed insects into a
crushing machine [35], to persist at a tedious task [36], or to
administer noise blasts [37]. Yet another approach, developed by
Slater and colleagues, has been to reproduce the Milgram
paradigm in a virtual reality environment where shocks are
delivered to a life-like avatar [38]. Importantly, the researchers
were able to demonstrate the validity of this method by showing
that, despite the contrived nature of the set-up, participants’
behavioural and physiological responses were very similar to those
reported by Milgram [6].
These various approaches are highly creative and all have
helped to advance our understanding of the obedience process.
They have also led to a resurgence of interest in Milgram’s work
[39,40]. Yet, they still lack one element which is crucial to the
impact of Milgram’s studies. For, in different ways, the different
types of study try to diminish the harm to participants (and hence
the ethical concerns) by diminishing the harm they are required to
inflict another person – either because the act is less intense or
because the other person is less real. But, in so doing they diminish
the drama and distance the behaviours inside the laboratory from
the real-world phenomena outside and hence lose the very thing
that made Milgram’s studies so compelling and so impactful. As a
result, it has proved difficult for the findings from such studies to
challenge Milgram’s claims.
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This raises the question of whether it is possible to find a way of
maintaining the drama of Milgram’s studies while diminishing the
harm. Can we ensure that people are fully involved in highly
consequential actions without these actions having distressing or
enduring consequences for the self? What is more, can we record
these actions in a way that makes them as impactful as Milgram’s
original?
To answer these questions, in the present research we report a
study that employs the methodology of Immersive Digital Realism
(IDR) to restage Milgram’s OtA research. This method draws on
the rich tradition of realist film theory and practice [41] and was
initially developed by Millard [42] to restage Gamson’s famous
sociological research into encounters with an unjust authority [43].
IDR involves six core steps. First, one-to-one workshops
between a film director and actors are used to develop composite
fictional characters that draw in part on selected aspects of the
actors’ work histories and personal lives as well as those of their
peer groups. Second, the method involves deep immersion in
character and context in preparation for filming. Third, the
director strategically withholds details of the dramatic context
from the actors – so that, in the present instance, they are briefed
to perform as participants in a social psychology experiment but
not given any more specific information (e.g., about the nature of
the study or its design). Fourth, the method uses real-world design
and environments as much as possible. In the present case, this
involved attempting to faithfully reproduce both the laboratory
environment and the shock machine. Fifth, filming involves long
takes and multi-camera coverage. This is made possible (and
relatively inexpensive) by modern digital technologies and frees the
actors to focus on their interactions with the environment and
other participants. In the present case, individual takes or
recordings were up to 45 minutes in length. Sixth, at the
conclusion of the first take, the film director conducts a debrief
with each actor providing information about the project and its
aims, differentiating between the behavior of the character and
how they personally might have behaved, and addressing any
questions or concerns they might have.
In the present study, a seventh step was added to this protocol in
light of the fact that IDR was also being used for the purpose of
psychology research. This involved a second debrief by a
psychologist that started by interviewing the actor to explore
how they felt during the study and why they acted as they did, and
collecting relevant psychometric data. After this, a full explanation
of the social psychological aspects of the research was provided.
IDR can be seen as an extension of previous work which has
examined issues raised by the Milgram paradigm using both role-
playing techniques [4,44,45] and immersive video environments
[46]. However, the critical difference lies in the use of professional
actors who, guided by a professional director, are trained in the
ability to embody a character and who then explore how that
character would behave in context. That is, our participants are
not acting ‘as if’ they were an individual in the Milgram paradigm
but rather ‘as’ a character who is then put in the Milgram
paradigm. In this sense the term ‘role play’ [47] is misleading in
the context of IDR. What is more, IDR maintains the drama and
intensity of the phenomena under consideration while also
diminishing any harm due to this experience. Accordingly, it
meets Baumrind’s [14] ethical criterion, but also meets our own
criteria of doing so without promoting a pernicious ideology that
ennobles the infliction of harm on others [15]. Indeed, a major
part of the psychological debrief (Step 7 of IDR above) was to
make participants aware of the dangers of such ideologies.
The Present Study
The present study formed part of a larger trans-disciplinary
project in which social psychology and documentary film
researchers worked together to interrogate aspects of Milgram’s
OtA studies. Indeed, in this regard, it is notable that Milgram [49]
himself saw his studies as a combination of science and art –
arguing that film is unique in providing researchers with richly
textured records of human behaviour that can continually be
reanalysed by other social scientists. The project was therefore
designed so that separate film and social psychology studies would
each dovetail into the other. Specifically, film researchers
addressed significant gaps in the audio-visual records through
the authoring of a contemporary film interrogating Milgram’s
Obedience whilst social psychology researchers built on IDR to
examine aspects of participant behaviour within the paradigm.
This involved an extended period of preparation that used the
Milgram archives and other materials to see exactly how the
original work had been staged and recorded [10]. It also involved
a lengthy period of dialogue between the film researchers and the
psychologists so each could understand the basis of the others’
work.
In this paper, we focus on the social psychology study. In
drawing on IDR to revisit the Milgram paradigm, this had two key
goals. The first was to validate our core claim that IDR allows us
to explore how people behave in extreme contexts such as the
Milgram paradigm. In particular, given that participants are
actors, it needs to be shown that their behaviour corresponds to
the behavior actually seen in the original studies rather than to
people’s beliefs about their likely behavior (Slater uses a similar
logic to interrogate virtual reality methods [38]). As Milgram
himself noted, these are very different things since people radically
underestimate how far they will go in inflicting shocks (only 24%
think that they would go beyond 150 V and none believe that they
would go beyond 300 V). The key question, then, is whether in
IDR the level of shock that participants administer is more akin to
the behaviour of real participants or to the estimates of non-
participants. Moreover, given that shock levels differ across
variants of the Milgram paradigm, it is pertinent to ask whether
IDR participants show similar variation in the level of shock that
they are prepared to inflict. Finally, turning from levels of
obedience to the interactions that underpin this, it is important to
establish whether the prod from the Experimenter that most
resembles an order (i.e., Prod 4) leads people to carry on shocking
(as popularly understood) or to stop doing so (as is actually the
case)?
To explore these questions, as well as recreating Milgram’s
original Coronary (or New Baseline) condition (his Experiment 5
[6]), we also restaged four other variants designed to capture the
full range of behaviour that the paradigm elicits [33]. These were
those in which (a) there was no feedback from the Learner
(Milgram’s original pilot; No L Feedback), (b) two confederates
withdrew from the experiment, leaving the naive participant to
continue alone (Milgram’s Experiment 17, 2 Peers Rebel), (c) the
Experimenter left the room and gave instructions from afar
(Experiment 7, E Absent), and (d) the Learner was connected to
the shock machine in the same room as the Teacher (Experiment
3, L Proximal).
In assessing whether IDR is able to capture the same behaviour
as Milgram’s studies, the study tested three key hypotheses derived
from the body of previous research discussed above:
H1. That a majority (rather than a minority) of participants in the
IDR paradigm would prove willing to administer shocks greater
than 150 volts.
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H2. That the mean maximum level of shock delivered in original
variants of the OtA paradigm (as reported by Milgram [6]) would
predict the maximum level of shock administered by participants
in different variants of the IDR paradigm.
H3. That when participants in the IDR paradigm are given Prod 4
as a means of urging them to continue, this would encourage them
to discontinue.
To the extent that these hypotheses are supported, a second
goal of the study was to use IDR to explore why people do (or do
not) obey the Experimenter. More specifically, we sought to
explore issues related to the engaged followership model [32,33].
In the first instance this would be supported by evidence consistent
with H3. However, to explore this in more detail, during post-
experimental debriefing we also asked participants to indicate the
extent to which, in the course of the study, they had (a) identified
with the Experimenter and the scientific project he was leading
and (b) identified with the Learner and the broader community of
which he was a representative. This allowed us to test a further
hypothesis:
H4. That the maximum level of shock administered by
participants in the IDR paradigm would be predicted by their
relative identification with the Experimenter (vs. the Learner).
Methods
Participants
Participants were 14 actors (8 men, 6 women) chosen to
participate in the study on the basis of their proven competence as
professional actors. A further 4 actors were recruited to play the
role of confederates (1 as Experimenter, 1 as Learner, 2 as
Teachers in the Two Peers Rebel condition). (An additional
participant was assigned to the Bring-a Friend Condition discussed
by Rochat and Blass [50] and Russell [51]). However, because we
did not have access to sufficiently detailed information about how
to recreate this condition, our operationalization of it failed and
was aborted).
Prior to the study, the actors worked with a director (KM) to
develop fictional characters that they would play in the study. This
involved drawing on past biographical and professional experi-
ences to create a composite character. Participants were told that
their character would be taking part in a social psychology
experiment for which they had volunteered. However, beyond
this, they were given no specific details about what to expect when
they turned up to participate in the study.
Materials, design and procedure
As far as possible, the materials for the study were modelled on
those developed by Milgram for his original studies (i.e., as
described by Milgram [6,9]). In particular, this involved building a
laboratory set of the same size and with similar layout and
furnishings as well as building similar apparatus (see Figure 1).
Three participants took part in the study on each of five
consecutive days. They were randomly assigned to conditions, but
conditions were run in an order that met the logistical demands of
setting up the laboratory and briefing confederates on any given
day. Due to its prominence as a reference point for Milgram’s
work, half of the participants (i.e., 7) were assigned to the
Coronary condition. Two further participants were assigned to No
Learner Feedback, 2 Peers Rebel, and Experimenter Absent
conditions and one to the Learner Proximal Condition1.
The procedure for running each condition was intended to
replicate Milgram’s own procedure as closely as possible (see
Milgram [6,9] for details). Additional material was taken from the
Milgram archives). In particular, this meant that in all variants
other than the No Learner Feedback condition, the Learner made
a series of pre-determined protests after receiving particular level
of shock. When the Teacher proved unwilling to continue, he was
also encouraged to do so using Milgram’s series of four escalating
prods. It is worth noting, however, that as was the case in
Milgram’s own research [3,48], the requirements for the
Experimenter to engage in meaningful discourse with the Teacher
meant that it proved hard for him to stick rigidly to this script.
Participants were filmed using cameras and microphones
concealed behind one-way glass and within the experimental
apparatus. At the end of the study they were extensively debriefed:
first, by the director (as part of the IDR process outlined above)
and then by one of two psychologists (SAH or SDR). In the
context of this debriefing they were also asked to respond on 11-
point rating scales to four questions. Two assessed their character’s
identification with the Experimenter and the Learner (as used by
Reicher and colleagues [33]; Thinking back to the study, how
much did you identify with the Experimenter and his scientific
goals? Thinking back to the study, how much did you identify with
the Learner as a member of the general community?; where
0 = did not identify at all, 5 = identified moderately, 10 = identified
very much). Two assessed their stress during and after the study (as
used by Milgram [15]; Thinking back to the point in the
experiment when you felt most tense and nervous, how nervous
did you feel? where 0 = not at all, 5 = moderately, 10 = extremely;
All things considered, how do you feel about having participated in
this study? where 0 = very sorry, 5 = neither sorry nor glad,
10 = very glad).
Ethics statement
Participants were professional actors employed in that capacity
by KM. Consent for the filmed components of the research took
the form of a standard film industry written contract. At the
conclusion of the director’s debrief, SAH and SDR interviewed
participants and administered a short questionnaire to collect
additional data. At this point additional verbal consent was
obtained and recorded by SAH and SDR to use the data that had
been collected for psychological research. Verbal consent was
sought as it would have been impractical and disruptive to obtain
written consent at this point in the procedure. All these
arrangements were approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee at Macquarie University (the site of the study and the
institution responsible for administering the main grant that
supported the research; Approval No.: 5201300440). Approval
was conditional on all outputs from the study making it clear that
participants were actors. Additional approval was obtained from
the Research Ethics Committees at the University of Queensland
(Approval No.: 2014000828) and the University of St. Andrews
(Approval No.: PS11050).
Results
Data from the study are presented in Data S1.
Tests of H1
Consistent with H1, a majority of participants administered
shocks greater than 150 volts. Indeed, although there was
considerable variability in their responses (SD = 89.5), all went as
far as 195 volts (‘‘very strong shock’’) and, on average, they went
as far as 300 volts (M= 301.1). This point is significantly greater
than 150 volts (t(13) = 6.32, p,.001), but (non-significantly) lower
than the weighted mean level of shock administered in the
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corresponding variants of Milgram’s studies (344.8; t(13) =21.82,
p= .09). It is also significantly greater than the midpoint (249.0)
between the mean maximum shock that Milgram’s participants
estimated they would deliver (146.4) and the mean maximum
shock that they actually delivered (344.8; t(13) = 2.32, p= .04) –
indicating that responses were closer to the latter than the former.
Tests of H2
Figure 2 plots the maximum level of shock administered by
participants in different variants of the IDR paradigm against the
mean maximum level of shock delivered in the corresponding OtA
variant (as reported by Milgram [6]). In line with H2, from this it
can be seen that there was a positive linear correlation between
these variables, such that the levels of shock observed in Milgram’s
original variants were a strong and significant predictor of the
maximum level of shock administered in the IDR paradigm
(r(13) = .59, p= .03).
Qualitative data also pointed to a strong correspondence
between the behaviour displayed in Milgram’s original studies
[6,49,52] and that observed in the IDR paradigm. In particular,
most participants were clearly agitated and stressed during the
study itself, but also very relieved when it was concluded, as well as
happy to have participated once debriefed [15,16]. This was
confirmed by post-experimental measures on which participants
reported being tense and nervous during the study (M= 7.78;
significantly greater than the scale midpoint, t(13) = 5.00, p,.001)
but ultimately glad to have taken part in it (M= 7.07; significantly
greater than the scale midpoint, t(13) = 3.52, p,.01).
Tests of H3
Consistent with H3, it is apparent that of the ten participants
who were given Prod 4 in an attempt to urge them to continue
only one participant proceeded to administer further shocks while
nine immediately discontinued (Binomial test, p= .01). Here too it
is apparent that the manner in which participants broke off at this
point closely resembled behaviour observed in Milgram’s original
studies [29,48]. In particular, they objected strongly to the
Experimenter’s assertion that ‘‘you have no choice’’ and retorted
that, in fact, they did (as also evidenced in other more recent
studies [28,30]). This is exemplified by the following exchanges:
P3 Tom [Coronary]
E: It’s absolutely essential that you continue.
T: Essential to what?
E: Look you don’t have a choice, you need to …
T: Everybody’s got a choice, mate. Everybody’s got a choice. Like,
like…you know this this guy’s in pain in here.
E: Are you refusing to go on?
T: Well, I’m uncomfortable to go on, yeah. He scr- have a listen to
him.
[refuses to continue]
P10 Lana [E absent]
E: Lana, it’s absolutely essential that you carry on.
T: Ok well you, you might have to do this with somebody else
because I’m hearing somebody wanting to be let out I’m. I can’t
…
E: I’m sorry, Lana, you don’t have a choice.
T: Sorry, what do you mean that I don’t have a choice?
E: You need to carry on.
T: I know that I didn’t understand what exactly I was signing up
for but I feel very very uncomfortable.
[refuses to continue]
P11 Helena [E absent]
E: It’s absolutely essential that you continue, Helena
T: Why is it essential? It’s essential that I hurt him, I don’t think so.
James, are you alright?
Figure 1. The set for the research laboratory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109015.g001
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E: Listen Helena
T: What?
E: You don’t have a choice …
T: I th-
E: … please continue
T: I think I do have a choice, John. And I choose not to continue.
[refuses to continue]
Tests of H4
Consistent with observations that the drama of the Milgram
paradigm derives from the fact that it creates a situation in which
participants attend to both the Experimenter and the Learner, and
hence are torn between the contradictory demands made of them
by these two sources, in their post-experimental responses
participants reported having high levels of identification with both
the Experimenter (M= 6.64; significantly greater than the scale
midpoint, t(13) = 2.24, p= .04) and with the Learner (M= 7.04;
significantly greater than the scale midpoint, t(13) = 3.08, p= .01).
In line with H4, it is also apparent that relative identification
with the Experimenter and the Learner (i.e., iE – iL) determines
which voice people attend to and hence their degree of obedience
to experimental instructions. Thus relative identification was a
good predictor of the maximum level of shock that participants
were prepared to administer (r(13) = .56, p= .04). This can be seen
from Figure 3 which presents a scatterplot and regression line for
these data. Interestingly, though, while, on its own, identification
with the Learner was a strong and significant negative predictor of
the maximum shock delivered (r(13) =2.59, p= .03, identification
with the Experimenter was only a moderate (but non-significant)
positive predictor (r(13) = .36, p= .21).
Discussion
The primary goal of this research was to explore the possibility
of using a new methodology – Immersive Digital Realism (IDR) –
to restage Milgram’s controversial Obedience to Authority (OtA)
research in a way that is both impactful and ethical. While a
number of paradigms have recently been developed for this
purpose, key problems with these are that, in circumventing the
ethical challenges of this task, they either do not involve
administering the maximum level of shock [30], do not involve
real participants [38], or do not recreate the dramatic tension of
competing ties to Experimenter and Learner [28]. IDR addresses
these problems by using actors who are naı¨ve to the nature and
purpose of the experimental paradigm to play the part of normal
research participants. It uses trained participants who can both
assume a character, as directed, during the study, while
maintaining a clear separation between that character and their
selves outside the study. In this way participation involves no harm
for the actor.
Analytically, then, using this methodology raises two key
questions: first, whether or not IDR does actually capture similar
behaviour to Milgram’s original studies; second, whether or not it
is capable of shedding light on the psychology of Milgram’s
participants.
Speaking to the first of these questions, it is apparent from our
quantitative analyses that there is a close correspondence between
the behaviour observed in our IDR study and that observed in
Milgram’s original research. This is evidenced in at least three
Figure 2. Scatterplot and regression line of maximum shocks delivered by participants in IDR study against mean maximum shocks
in corresponding Milgram variant. Note: Numbers identify individual participants and correspond to the order in which they participated in the
IDR study.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109015.g002
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ways. First, by the fact that participants, on average, went as far as
300 volts (much higher than people imagine they will, and only
marginally lower than the levels found by Milgram). Second, by
the fact that levels of obedience vary across conditions in the same
way as in Milgram’s own studies. Third, by the fact that people
overwhelmingly respond to orders (i.e. Prod 4: ‘‘You have no other
choice, you must continue’’) by disobeying rather than obeying
(again, reflecting what people do in Milgram’s studies rather than
what they believe that people do [27,28]).
What is particularly interesting in relation to this last finding is
that participants showed neither blind obedience (of the form the
OtA studies are often understood to show [16]) nor reflexive
disobedience (of the form people imagine themselves and others
showing). Instead, resistance developed in response to the
Experimenter’s attempt to deny participants’ sense of free will
[53] and an associated violation of norms associated with shared
identity (in which cooperation is understood to be voluntary rather
than coerced [54]).
In addition to the statistical analyses we have provided, there
are a number of other telling parallels between the behaviour of
IDR participants and the behaviour of Milgram’s participants – as
can be gleaned both from his filmed materials [52] and from
recordings in the archives. For instance, it is clear that in both
cases, participants are concerned with both the success of the
experiment and the welfare of the Learner. They employ a range
of strategies to try and overcome the contradiction between the
two: even as they continue shocking they try to signal the right
answer by pronouncing it more loudly, they show despair when
the answer is wrong, they try to make the shocks as short as
possible, they implore the Experimenter to check up on the
Learner, and they try themselves to talk directly to the Learner
and assess his welfare. Moreover, they are highly stressed by the
contradictory demands put on them by the Experimenter and the
Learner. This is clear in their behavior and it is also clear from
their responses to psychometric measures during the psychological
debriefing. Finally, and once more akin to the reactions of
Milgram’s own participants, they show great relief when they meet
the Learner and discover that he is unharmed [6].
At the same time – and this is the core of our ethical argument –
there was a clear discontinuity between the actors and the
characters they played. While participants acknowledged during
both debriefings that the experience had been intense, none
showed any sign of distress and all indicated that they had found
the experience enlightening. Indeed, this ability to separate from
one’s character is hardly surprising since it is, of course, a staple of
the acting profession. In sum, our findings sustain the argument
that IDR provides a means of exploring the full intensity of the
Milgram paradigm in a way that gains ethical legitimacy without
losing drama.
All this evidence together also begins to address the study’s
second goal of investigating why Milgram’s participants acted as
they did. In the first instance, it scotches suggestions that
participants only attend to the Experimenter and ignore the
Learner, as proposed in Milgram’s agentic state account. Clearly
they attend to both and hence the key question becomes which
voice takes precedence [26,33]. Speaking to this point, it also
confirms that orders do not increase the weight of the Experi-
menter’s voice, but rather diminish it. Moreover, it is apparent
from the occasions on which Prod 4 was issued that orders disrupt
the relationship between Teacher and Experimenter and lead the
former seeking to assert their autonomy from the latter. This
accords with an engaged follower perspective that sees obedience
Figure 3. Scatterplot and regression line of maximum shocks delivered by participants in IDR study against relative identification
with the Experimenter (versus the Learner). Note: Numbers identify individual participants and correspond to the order in which they
participated in the IDR study.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109015.g003
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(vs. disobedience) as a function of the extent to which the Teacher
identifies with the Experimenter over the Learner.
However, we also have more direct evidence to support this
perspective. On the one hand, participants in character indicate a
high level of identification with both Experimenter and Learner,
thus confirming our contention that the Milgram paradigm is
fundamentally dilemmatic [10]. On the other hand, levels of
obedience (and differences in obedience between different variants
of the paradigm) are predicted by relative identification as
measured through post-experimental measures. This accords both
with our own re-analyses of Milgram’s findings [33] and with those
of others [26].
Limitations and Future Research
Notwithstanding its advantages relative to other methods that
have recently been developed to reopen the investigation of
Milgram’s classic studies, it is clear that the present study also has
some significant limitations. We have already discussed at some
length obvious issues raised by the fact that participants were
recruited as professional actors who were taking part in a staged
production rather than as members of the community contributing
to scientific research. Here again, though, we see the particular
value of IDR as a research (and filmic) tool is that rather than
immersing actors in a script, it immerses them in a character and
then places them in a strong context in ways that allow for an in-
depth exploration of the dynamic interaction between these
elements (which is also why the professionalism of both actors and
director is crucial). Because this interaction is central to the issues
that are explored in social psychology – especially in its classic
studies [55,56] – we therefore see the method as compatible with
the discipline’s core goals rather than at odds with them. Indeed, it
is this dramatic staging that makes the discipline’s classic studies so
compelling, not only as demonstrations of social psychological
processes but also as film [10,57,58].
Nonetheless, IDR does raise serious issues that need to be
acknowledged. Not least, combining documentary film using
professional directors and professional actors with a social
psychology experiment leads to logistical and financial constraints.
It requires a lengthy period of set up, it requires extensive dialogue
between the film makers and the psychologists so that each
understands the perspectives and the requirements of the other. It
requires filming facilities and often (as in this case) the construction
of a set. There are limited windows in which it is possible to have
the services of actors and each trial is lengthy, so that it is very
difficult to run large numbers of participants. In the present study,
this meant that our quantitative analyses all had relatively low
power. This problem was to some extent mitigated by the fact that
our hypotheses were clearly grounded in previous theory and
research, and generally received strong support. However, if only
to allow for robust statistical comparison of different experimental
treatments, it would certainly be valuable (if expensive) for future
research to involve a larger sample of participants.
Concluding Comment
Since Milgram’s work was first published over half a century
ago, researchers have been held in the grip of a powerful dilemma.
On the one hand, Milgram uncovered a phenomenon of ‘‘great
consequence’’ that they were impelled to study further [2]. On the
other hand, the great controversy that his paradigm fuelled
precluded them using his own procedures to do so [4]. In recent
years researchers have used their ingenuity to resolve this dilemma
by endeavouring to come as close as possible to the fire of the OtA
paradigm without burning themselves on its ethical flames [31].
The present research represents a novel attempt to contribute to
this collective effort.
As with any stand-alone piece of research, its has limitations.
We are certainly not suggesting that IDR supplants the many
other ways in which obedience is currently being studied.
Nevertheless, as part of a rapidly growing corpus of work, we
believe the study can add an essential element that other methods
cannot supply. Most particularly, this is because it provides
dramatic evidence of participants’ willingness not only to comply
with an authority but also to resist it [59]. It also supports claims
that the path they take is not pursued blindly, but follows lawfully
from their relative identification with competing sources of
influence [33].
In this too, the study provides clear evidence to support claims –
like those of Tony Lagouranis, quoted at the start [1] – that
obedience is not an ineluctable proclivity but a choice. Interest-
ingly, the force of this point is seen most clearly when agents of
influence attempt to deny their subordinates the opportunity to
exercise free will [53]. For rather than strengthening compliance,
this instead engenders resistance. Far, then, from showing that the
landscape of tyranny is bereft of human agency, we see instead
that identity-based choice is what makes tyranny possible – and
also what makes tyranny vulnerable to overthrow. In these terms,
as Lagouranis suggests, it is time to reject the comforts of the
obedience alibi [20]. It is time instead, to engage with the
uncomfortable truth that, when people inflict harm to others, they
often do so wittingly and willingly.
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